Signaling in Retrospect and the Informational Structure of Markets

A. Spence

No 2001-6, Nobel Prize in Economics documents from Nobel Prize Committee

Abstract: Nobel Prize Lecture

Keywords: Signaling; Asymmetric Information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 38 pages
Date: 2001-12-08
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Journal Article: Signaling in Retrospect and the Informational Structure of Markets (2002)
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