Refugee Resettlement and Solidarity

Jose Alcalde and Matthias Dahm
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Matthias Dahm: School of Economics, University of Leicester

No 25-01, QM&ET Working Papers from University of Alicante, D. Quantitative Methods and Economic Theory

Abstract: Refugee resettlement is one of the most important challenges of our time. We consider a set of host States required to collectively provide a given number of resettlement places. International cooperation must be voluntary, but host States can be compensated. We first show that a market approach can generate sufficient resettlement places. However, there are pervasive opportunities for manipulation. We reformulate the Ausubel (2004) auction as a procurement auction for resettlement places, but allow for the possibility that procurement costs are covered by the participants in the auction (Cramton et al., 2013). This Compensation Mechanism determines a (heterogeneous) set of transfers in exchange for resettlement places provided and allows host States to specialise in providing places or finance resettlement in other States. We show that sincere bidding is a dominant strategy and that it leads to efficient allocations of the required number of places.

Keywords: Asylum Seekers; Refugees; Resettlement Places; Refugee Quotas; Burden-Sharing; Responsibility-Sharin (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D47 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 73
Date: 2025-09-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-mig
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ris:qmetal:021526

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