The Cooperative Endorsement of a Strategic Game

Penélope Hernández and Jose Silva
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Penélope Hernández: ERI-CES. Departamento de Análisis Económico. Facultad de Economía.
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Penelope Hernandez ()

No 12-9, QM&ET Working Papers from University of Alicante, D. Quantitative Methods and Economic Theory

Abstract: This note provides a way to translate an n-person strategic game to a characteristic cooperative game assuming that the set of players of the cooperative game is the set of pure actions of the strategic game. The Core is characterized through coalitions generated with only one action for each player and the total coalition. We obtain the worth of the total coalition to guarantee the non-emptyness condition. In particular, for a two-player game, this value is equal to the maximal sum of the diagonals.

Keywords: Cooperative games; Core (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 11 pages
Date: 2012-04-24
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
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Related works:
Working Paper: The cooperative endorsement of a strategic game (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ris:qmetal:2012_009

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