Random Housing with Existing Tenants

Jose Alcalde

No 13-5, QM&ET Working Papers from University of Alicante, D. Quantitative Methods and Economic Theory

Abstract: We explore the problem of distributing a group of indivisible objects, some of which incorporate a primitive assignment of use, or tenancy right. Within this framework we analyze the existence of rules always selecting an ex-ante efficient allocation, conditioned to a preservation of the tenancy rights. We realize that a probabilistic version of the Deferred Acceptance procedure (Gale and Shapley, 1962), is efficient and, from an ordinal point of view, superior to the randomized approaches of the Top Trading Cycles (Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez, 1999) and the New House 4 mechanism employed in the MIT.

Keywords: Correlated Priorities; Random Assignment; Serial Rule; Matching Markets; Ordinal Efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D63 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34 pages
Date: 2013-09-25
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ris:qmetal:2013_005

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