A Consensual Committee Using Approval Balloting

Begoña Subiza and Josep E. Peris

No 14-5, QM&ET Working Papers from University of Alicante, D. Quantitative Methods and Economic Theory

Abstract: A new voting rule for electing committees is described. Specifically, we use approval balloting and propose a voting procedure guaranteeing that if a committee representing (in a determined proportion) all voters exists, then the selected committee has to represent all voters at least in the same proportion. This condition is a generalization of the unanimity property and the usual voting procedures in this context do not satisfy it.

Keywords: Approval balloting; committee election; unanimity; consensus (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15 pages
Date: 2014-11-14
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ris:qmetal:2014_005

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