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Equal Awards versus Equal Losses in Bankruptcy Problems

Jose Alcalde () and Josep E. Peris ()

No 17-2, QM&ET Working Papers from University of Alicante, D. Quantitative Methods and Economic Theory

Abstract: The Constrained Equal Awards and Equal Losses rules are traditional ways to solve bankruptcy problems. These rules are characterized by two parameters α and β that represent, respectively, the maximum amount a claimant receives, or the maximum amount a claimant loses. Moreover, these rules define a partition in the set of agents: those who are equally rationed, and those sustaining a lower rationing (because their maximal award and maximal loss cannot exceed their claim). We investigate the relationship between α and β, and the corresponding partitions they originate in the set of agents, by using a characteristic τ measuring the relative degree of conflict.

Keywords: Bankruptcy Problem; Relative Degree of Conflict (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D63 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Date: 2017-02-21
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