Affirmative Action Through Endogenous Set-Asides
Jose Alcalde () and
Matthias Dahm ()
No 20-1, QM&ET Working Papers from University of Alicante, D. Quantitative Methods and Economic Theory
We study the effects of affirmative action through endogenous set-asides. We propose a share auction for dual sourcing in which more intensive affirmative action strengthens the favoured provider. This induces potentially more competitive procurement overall. Our main result considers a complete information setting and provides a condition under which affirmative action not only guarantees very substantial minority representation, but also reduces the buyer's provision cost compared to a first-price auction. We also consider extensions of the benchmark model, including to a setting in which providers have private information about their costs.
Keywords: Affirmative Action; Bidding Credits; Bidding Preferences; Set-Asides (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D47 H57 J15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 54 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
https://web.ua.es/es/dmcte/documentos/qmetwp2001.pdf Full text (application/pdf)
Working Paper: Affirmative Action through Endogenous Set-Asides (2020)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ris:qmetal:2020_001
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in QM&ET Working Papers from University of Alicante, D. Quantitative Methods and Economic Theory Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Julio Carmona ().