Minimum Cost Spanning Tree Games with Revenues: “Stable” Payoffs when the Core is Empty

Begoña Subiza, José Manuel Jiménez-Gómez () and Josep E Peris ()
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José Manuel Jiménez-Gómez: Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Dept. d’Economia and ECO-SOS
Josep E Peris: Universitat d’Alacant, MQiTE and IUDESP.

No 24-5, QM&ET Working Papers from University of Alicante, D. Quantitative Methods and Economic Theory

Abstract: A minimum cost spanning tree problem analyzes the way to efficiently connect agents to a source when they are located at different places. Estévez-Fernández and Reijnierse (2014) study minimum cost spanning tree problems with revenues (agents can obtain a benefit, if they are connected to the source) and show that the cost-revenues game may have an empty core. In this context, we provide a non-empty unique set that coincides with the core, whenever the core is not empty. In so doing, we define a dominance relation among individually rational distributions of the net revenue and compute the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set regarding this dominance relation. It is important to highlight that the dominance relation is based on the fact that a majority of agents do not block the sharing of the net revenue.

Keywords: Minimum cost spanning tree; Cost-revenues game; Core; Stable set (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D63 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
Date: 2024-09-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-gth
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ris:qmetal:2024_005

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