Undominated mechanisms

Timan Borgers (), Jiangtao Li () and Kexin Wang ()
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Timan Borgers: University of Michigan
Jiangtao Li: Singapore Management University
Kexin Wang: Singapore Management University

No 12-2024, Economics and Statistics Working Papers from Singapore Management University, School of Economics

Abstract: We study the design of mechanisms when the designer faces multiple plausible scenarios and is uncertain about the true scenario. A mechanism is dominated by another if the latter performs at least as well in all plausible scenarios and strictly better in at least one. A mechanism is undominated if no other feasible mechanism dominates it. We show how analyzing undominated mechanisms could be useful and illustrate the tractability of characterizing such mechanisms. This approach provides an alternative criterion for mechanism design under non-Bayesian uncertainty, complementing existing methods.

Keywords: Robust Mechanism Design; Undominated Mechanisms; Maxmin Approrach; Regret Minimization; Second-price Auction; Random Reserve Price (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 37 pages
Date: 2024-11-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-mic and nep-sea
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ris:smuesw:2024_012

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