Mobile Termination with Asymmetric Networks

Ralf Dewenter and Justus Haucap

No 23/2003, Working Paper from Helmut Schmidt University, Hamburg

Abstract: This paper examines mobile termination fees and their regulation when networks are asymmetric in size. It is demonstrated that with consumer ignorance about the exact termination rates (a) a mobile network's termination rate is the higher the smaller the network's size (as measured through its subscriber base) and (b) asymmetric regulation of only the larger operators in a market will, ceteris paribus, induce the smaller operators to increase their termination rates. The results are supported by empirical evidence using data on mobile termination rates from 48 European mobile operators from 2001 to 2003.

Keywords: mobile termination; telecommunications; consumer ignorance; price regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L13 L51 L96 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 2003-10
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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