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Das Governance-Dilemma der demokratischen Wirtschaftspolitik

Joern Kruse ()
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Joern Kruse: Helmut Schmidt University, Hamburg, Postal: Helmut Schmidt University Hamburg, Institute of Economic Policy, Holstenhofweg 85, 22043 Hamburg

No 94/2009, Working Paper from Helmut Schmidt University, Hamburg

Abstract: As a result of the prevailing governance structure, economic policy in democracies usually suffers from specific deficiencies. Among these are the predominance of distributive over efficiency objectives, the neglect of long-run effects, and the lack of or biased use of expert knowledge in the political decision making process. These deficiencies can be attributed to a 'monopoly of democratic legitimacy' of the politicians and parties, an overloaded democratic delegation, the influence of interest groups, and the short-run incentives in the political process. The focus of this paper is on the reform of the governance structure of economic policy. It is suggested that a 'dual democratic legitimacy' should be introduced. A 'senate' which is independent of the political parties will be directly elected by the people. The senate firstly works as a second chamber in bicameralistic legislation, closely cooperating with consultative expert institutions. Secondly, the senate acts as a principal for any public institution outside of the parliament and the government, appointing the top personnel.

Keywords: Delegation; Politische Institutionen; Zwei-Kammer-Systeme; Senat (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D02 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2009-08-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-ger, nep-pbe and nep-pol
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