Science and teaching: Two-dimensional signalling in the academic job market
Andrea Schneider ()
No 95/2009, Working Paper from Helmut Schmidt University, Hamburg
Post-docs signal their ability to do science and teaching to get a tenure giving universities the possibility of separating highly talented agents from the low talented ones. However separating that means signalling effort for the highly talented becomes even more important in a two-dimensional signalling case. This attracts notice to time constraints. Under weak conditions separating equilibria do not exist if time constraints are binding. The existing equilibria are more costly but without additional information compared to the one-dimensional case. Considering this, the efficiency of the current two-dimensional academic job market signalling can be improved by switching to a one-dimensional one.
Keywords: Multi-dimensional signalling; Academic job market; Teaching and Research (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 I23 J41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-edu, nep-lab, nep-mic and nep-sog
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ris:vhsuwp:2009_095
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