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Tax evasion and cognitive dissonance

Klaus Beckmann and Susan Gattke ()
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Susan Gattke: Helmut Schmidt University, Hamburg

No 142/2014, Working Paper from Helmut Schmidt University, Hamburg

Abstract: We introduce public signals and cognitive dissonance into the standard Allingham-Sandmo- Yitzhaki (ASY) model of tax evasion. It turns out that the pres- ence of cognitive dissonance attenuates tax evasion as individuals dislike allowing their true bevhaviour to diverge from their public statement of the “admissible” degree of tax evasion, which, in turn, they use to influence the probability of detection. Some potential policy conclusions and extensions are discussed.

Keywords: tax evasion; cognitive dissonance; public signals (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D03 H26 H30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 12 pages
Date: 2014-04-17
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-iue, nep-pbe and nep-pub
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