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Competition and competition policy: at the junction of the future and past

Конкуренция и конкурентная политика: на стыке будущего и прошлого

Andrey Shastitko, Alexander Kurdin, Markova, Olga (Маркова, Ольга) (), Мeleshkina, Аnna (Мелешкина, Анна) (), Anastasia Morosanova, Pavlova, Natalia (Павлова, Наталья) () and Shpakova, Anastasia (Шпакова, Анастасия) ()
Additional contact information
Markova, Olga (Маркова, Ольга): The Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration
Мeleshkina, Аnna (Мелешкина, Анна): The Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration
Pavlova, Natalia (Павлова, Наталья): The Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration
Shpakova, Anastasia (Шпакова, Анастасия): The Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration

Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Anna Meleshkina

Published Papers from Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration

Abstract: The report reviewed four current areas of competition policy, related both to new phenomena and traditional antitrust plots. 1) Digital transformation leads to the emergence of new business strategies, however, new sources of risks of restricting competition arise: algorithmic pricing, big data, multilateral markets, platforms. 2) Imports of technology and political sanctions can reduce the effectiveness of the use of antitrust immunity for holders of exclusive rights to the results of intellectual activity (RID). A gradual transition to a new regime of anti-monopoly policy in the field of RID circulation is needed. 3) The development of supranational antitrust promotes the use of complementary capabilities of different countries antimonopoly authorities. Barriers to supranational antitrust are the heterogeneity of the participating States and the lack of sustainability of supranational antitrust authorities. 4) The problem of bilateral monopoly does not lose relevance. High transaction costs and negative externalities from the parties' failure to reach an agreement are the basis for government intervention using the comparative advantages of the antimonopoly authority.

Pages: 68 pages
Date: 2019-01
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