Effects of the Third Party Errors

Andrey Shastitko

Published Papers from Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration

Abstract: Type-I and type-II errors effects do matter both from the rules enforcement perspective and vertically upward to rules enactment. The paper support conventional idea about detrimental influence on deterrence of both types of errors. At the same time special role of type-I errors is demonstrated based on strategic interaction between economic exchange participants supported by third-party enforcement with opportunities to discriminate players. The paper highlights the issue that errors in enforcement is not whole story: the simple classification of cases is suggested from the perspective of type-I and type-II errors in rules enforcement and rules enactment.

Keywords: types-I&II errors; institutions; rules enforcement; rules enactment; discrimination; Nash equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D02 K10 K42 P48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 2014-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rnp:ppaper:re9021

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