Bargaining power and market power: approaches to separation for the purposes of antitrust policy
Переговорная сила и рыночная власть: подходы к разделению для целей антимонопольной политики
Morozov, Anton (Морозов, Антон Н.) () and
Pavlova, Natalia (Павлова, Наталья С.) ()
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Morozov, Anton (Морозов, Антон Н.): The Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration
Pavlova, Natalia (Павлова, Наталья С.): The Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration
Working Papers from Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration
At first glance, the effects of market power on one side of the market are similar to the effects of asymmetric distribution of bargaining power. This is the source of their mistaken confusion. These effects include both distributional and coordination. However, some of the effects may be related to the distribution of winnings, for example, in favor of sellers, but not related to restricting competition (the so-called exclusionary practices). The prevailing approaches to law enforcement in Russia, based primarily on the concepts of market power, dominant position and abuse of dominance, give rise to the question of the need to find a new balance between the categories of restriction of competition and the effects of bargaining power.
Keywords: bargaining power; bargaining power; buyer power; balancing power; dominant position (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K21 L12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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