Social Benefits, Job Security and Corruption: What 'Fine' State Employees
Социальные льготы, гарантии занятости и коррупция: что «штрафует» бюджетников
Working Papers from Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration
In this study we use a panel micro data set from the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey to investigate the reasons for the existence of the stable private sector wage “premium” in the Russian labor market for the period 1994-2014. We do not find support for significantly higher job security and flexibility in the public sector but we do establish that differences in fringe benefits could explain at least 50% of the wage gap. Furthermore, we find that households with workers in the public sector receive lower earnings but enjoy the same level of consumption expenditures. Differences in assets and precautionary motives of workers cannot reconcile these discrepancies. Unexplained differences are referred to unreported income in the public sector, or bribes.
Keywords: public sector; inter-sector wage gap; RLMS School of Economics; Russia (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cis, nep-sog and nep-tra
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rnp:wpaper:3051
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Papers from Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by RANEPA maintainer ().