CHARACTERIZING THE NASH BARGAINING SOLUTION WITHOUT PARETO-OPTIMALITY
Terje Lensberg () and
RCER Working Papers from University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER)
Keywords: games; economic theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:roc:rocher:136
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