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Bidding Rings in Repeated Auctions

Andrzej Skrzypacz and Hugo Hopenhayn

No 463, RCER Working Papers from University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER)

Abstract: This paper considers the question of tacit collusion in repeated auctions with independent private values. McAfee and McMillan show that the extent of collusion is limited by the availability of transfers. If no transfers are possible, the private information of bidders precludes any collusive scheme beyond bid rotation (BRS), even when the cartel has unlimited enforcement.

Keywords: AUCTIONS; UNCERTAINTY; BIDDING (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D81 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 1999
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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