Wallis Working Papers

From University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy
University of Rochester, Wallis Institute, Harkness 109B Rochester, New York 14627 U.S.A..
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WP66: Pareto efficiency in the dynamic one-dimensional bargaining model: Tasos Kalandrakis
WP65: Computation of equilibrium values in the Baron and Ferejohn bargaining model: Tasos Kalandrakis
WP64: A Folk Theorem for Repeated Elections with Adverse Selection: John Duggan
WP63: Uncovered Sets: John Duggan
WP62: Coalitional Bargaining Equilibria: John Duggan
WP61: Radical Moderation: Recapturing Power in Two-party Parliamentary Systems: Tasos Kalandrakis and Arthur Spirling
WP60: A Newton Collocation Method for Solving Dynamic Bargaining Games: John Duggan and Tasos Kalandrakis
WP59: Information and Voting: the Wisdom of the Experts versus the Wisdom of the Masses: Joseph McMurray
WP58: A Vindication of Responsible Parties: John Duggan, Dan Bernhardt and Francesco Squintani
WP57: A Reputational Theory of Two Party Competition: Tasos Kalandrakis
WP56: Dynamics of the Presidential Veto: A Computational: John Duggan, Tasos Kalandrakis and Vikram Manjunath
WP55: Strategy-Proofness and Single-Crossing: Alejandro Saporiti
WP54: The Role of Media Slant in Elections and Economics: John Duggan and Cesar Martinelli
WP53: A Dynamic Model of Democratic Elections in Multidimensional Policy Spaces: John Duggan and Jeffrey Banks
WP52: Voting Equilibria in Multi-candidate Elections: John Duggan and Yoji Sekiya
WP51: Rationalizable Voting: Tasos Kalandrakis
WP50: Existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in electoral competition games: The hybrid case: Alejandro Saporiti
WP49: Bargaining Foundations of the Median Voter Theorem: John Duggan and Seok-ju Cho
WP48: Strategy-Proofness and Single-Crossing: Alejandro Saporiti
WP47: A Theory of Minority and Majority Governments: Tasos Kalandrakis
WP46: Majority Rule Dynamics with Endogenous Status Quo: Tasos Kalandrakis
WP45: Dynamic Legislative Policy Making: John Duggan and Tasos Kalandrakis
WP44: Robust Rational Turnout: Tasos Kalandrakis
WP43: Robust Rational Turnout: Tasos Kalandrakis
WP42: Roll Call Data and Ideal Points: Tasos Kalandrakis
WP41: A Reputational Theory of Two Party Competition: Tasos Kalandrakis
WP40: On Participation Games with Complete Information: Tasos Kalandrakis
WP39: Genericity of Minority Governments: The Role of Policy and Office: Tasos Kalandrakis
WP38: Proposal Rights and Political Power: Tasos Kalandrakis
WP37: Regularity of Pure Strategy Equilibrium Points in a Class of Bargaining Games: Tasos Kalandrakis
WP36: Dynamic Enfranchisement: William Jack and Roger Lagunoff
WP35: Inequality, Environmental Protection and Growth: Laura Marsiliani and Thomas Renstrom
WP34: Credible Communication in Dynastic Government: Roger Lagunoff
WP33: On the Size and Structure of Group Cooperation: Matthew Haag and Roger Lagunoff
WP32: A Positive Model of Overlapping Income Taxation in a Federation of States: Esteban Klor
WP31: Environmental Policy and Capital Movements: The Role of Government Commitment: Laura Marsiliani and Thomas Renstrom
WP30: On Income Inequality and Green Preferences: Laura Marsiliani and Thomas Renstrom
WP29: Non-Fully Strategic Information Transmission: Marco Ottaviani and Francesco Squintani
WP28: When to Tax Labor?: Parantap Basu and Thomas Renstrom
WP27: Endogeneous Firm Objectives: Thomas Renstrom and Erkan Yalcin
WP26: Social Choice in the General Spatial Model of Politics: Jeffrey Banks, John Duggan and Michel Le Breton
WP25: Nash implementation with a Private Good: John Duggan
WP24: A Multidimensional Model of Repeated Elections: Jeffrey Banks and John Duggan
WP23: Uniqueness of Stationary Equilibria in a one-Dimensional Model of Bargaining: Seok-ju Cho and John Duggan
WP22: Profit Sharing (with workers) Facilitates Collusion (among firms): Dan Bernhardt and Christopher Chambers
WP21: Non-Cooperative Games Among Groups: John Duggan
WP20: Existence of Nash Equilibria on Convex Sets: Jeffrey Banks and John Duggan
WP19: Electoral Competition with Policy-Motivated Candidates: John Duggan and Mark Fey
WP14: A Bayesian Model of Voting in Juries: John Duggan and Cesar Martinelli
WP14: Legislative Coalitions in a Bargaining Model with Externalities: Randall L. Clavert and Nathan Dietz
WP14: Bounds for Mixed Strategy Equilibria and the Spatial Model of Elections: Jeffrey Banks, John Duggan and Michel LeBreton
WP14: Establishing Cooperation Without Pre-Play Communication: Randall L. Clavert
WP14: Interpretation and Coordination in Constitutional Politics: Randall L. Clavert and James Johnson
WP11: Welfare Policy and Endogenous Selective Norms: Edward J. Bird
WP11: Politics, Altruism, and the Definition of Poverty: Edward J. Bird
WP11: Does the Welfare State Induce Risk Taking?: Edward J. Bird
WP10: The Evidence on Class Size: Eric Hanushek
WP9: Repeated Elections with Asymmetric Information: John Duggan
WP8: The Productivity Collapse in Schools: Eric Hanushek
WP7: Social Norms, Cultural Competition, and Welfare Reform: Scant Hope for the Collapsing Family: Edward J. Bird
WP6: The Income of Socialist Elites During the Transition to Capitalism: Credible Evidence from Longitudinal East German Data: Edward J. Bird, Joachim Frick and Gert Wagner
WP5: Does Welfare Ruin the Poor?: Edward J. Bird
WP4: Explaining Social Order: Internalization, External Enforcement, or Equilibrium?: Randall Calvert
WP3: Interpreting Recent Research on Schooling in Developing Countries: Eric Hanushek
WP2: Rationalizing School Spending: Efficiency, Externalities and Equity, and their Connection to Rising Costs: Eric Hanushek
WP1: What Constitutions Promote Capital Accumulation? A Political-Economy Approach: Per Krusell and José-Víctor Ríos-Rull