Proposal Rights and Political Power

Tasos Kalandrakis

No WP38, Wallis Working Papers from University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy

Abstract: In a canonical model of sequential collective bargaining over a divisible good we show that equilibrium expected payoffs are not restricted by players’ voting rights or their impatience. For all monotonic voting rules and discount factors, and for all divisions of the good among players, there exists a stationary proposal-making rule such that this division represents players’ expected payoffs in a Stationary Subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. The result attests to the significance of proposal rights in determining political power in collective deliberations.

Keywords: Power; Proposal Rights; Voting Rights. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16 pages
Date: 2004-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (31)

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