A Theory of Minority and Majority Governments
No WP47, Wallis Working Papers from University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy
We develop a theory of the emergence of minority and majority governments in multiparty parliamentary systems using a canonical non-cooperative bargaining model and assuming a policy space of arbitrary finite dimension, any number of political parties, and a general class of preferences over the government agreement space. Only majority governments form in the absence of significant political disagreement. Generically, minority governments form with positive probability when parties represented in parliament are ideologically polarized (or when utility from holding cabinet office is small relative to partisan political disagreement). Rather than being paradoxical, minority governments are a regular equilibrium phenomenon.
Pages: 32 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-pbe and nep-pol
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.wallis.rochester.edu/WallisPapers/wallis_47.pdf full text (application/pdf)
Journal Article: A Theory of Minority and Majority Governments (2015)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:roc:wallis:wp47
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Wallis Working Papers from University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy University of Rochester, Wallis Institute, Harkness 109B Rochester, New York 14627 U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Richard DiSalvo ().