Geographic Access Rules and Investments
Marc Bourreau and
Cambini Steffen
No 2013/28, RSCAS Working Papers from European University Institute
Abstract:
We analyse competition between vertically-integrated operators who build infrastructure and provide access in different geographical areas. Under full commitment, the regulator sets socially-optimal access rates that depend on the local degree of infrastructure competition. If he can only commit to implementing a single access price, the regulator can impose a uniform access price or deregulate access in competitive areas. While uniform access pricing leads to suboptimal investment, deregulation can spur investment. Still, deregulation is not an ideal solution to the commitment problem, as it tends to involve multiple and inefficient equilibria at the wholesale level, with either too little or too much investment.
Keywords: Next generation networks; Infrastructure investment; Geographical access regulation; Deregulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L51 L96 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-reg and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)
Downloads: (external link)
http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/26678/RSCAS_2013_28.pdf?sequence=1 (application/pdf)
http://hdl.handle.net/1814/26678 (text/html)
Related works:
Working Paper: Geographic Access Rules and Investments (2012) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rsc:rsceui:2013/28
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in RSCAS Working Papers from European University Institute Convento, Via delle Fontanelle, 19, 50014 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) Italy. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by RSCAS web unit ().