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A Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement for Services?

Bernard Hoekman and Petros C. Mavroidis

No 2015/25, RSCAS Working Papers from European University Institute

Abstract: Services are typically regulated for a variety of reasons. Regulation is typically influenced by political economy forces and may thus at times reflect protectionist motivations. Similar considerations arise for goods, but the potential for protectionist capture may be greater in services as many are self-regulated by domestic industry. The GATT embodies specific disciplines on product regulation in a separate agreement on technical barriers to trade (TBT) encouraging the use of international standards and norms that only impact on trade to the extent necessary to achieve the regulatory objective. The GATS does not include similar disciplines. We discuss reasons for this discrepancy and assess whether consideration should be given to seeking to adopt the TBT-type disciplines that apply to trade in goods.

Keywords: Trade Agreement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F13 K33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-int and nep-pol
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