Wage Dispersion and Team Performance - An Empirical Panel Analysis
Egon Franck () and
Stephan Nuesch ()
No 17, Working Papers from University of Zurich, Center for Research in Sports Administration (CRSA)
The impact of intra-team pay dispersion on team productivity is a highly discussed issue. On one hand, wage differentials provide incentives for higher employee effort. On the other hand, pay inequality discourages cooperation among team members, which reduces performance. Analyzing non-linear effects of wage dispersion in professional team sports, we find empirical evidence that an initial increase of intra-team inequity reduces team performance, but at some point the relation reverses. In addition, we show that the pay structure of a team clearly affects the teamÕs playing style.
Keywords: wage dispersion; team performance; relative deprivation; tournament theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D31 L83 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://repec.business.uzh.ch/RePEc/rsd/CRSA_WPS/17_CRSA_full.pdf Revised version, October 2008 (application/pdf)
Working Paper: Wage Dispersion and Team Performance - An Empirical Panel Analysis (2007)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rsd:wpaper:0017
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Papers from University of Zurich, Center for Research in Sports Administration (CRSA) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by IBW IT Support ().