The Computation of Perfect and Proper Equilibrium for Finite Games via Simulated Annealing

Stuart McDonald () and Liam Wagner

No WPR10_1, Risk & Uncertainty Working Papers from Risk and Sustainable Management Group, University of Queensland

Abstract: This paper exploits an analogy between the “trembles” that underlie the functioning of simulated annealing and the player “trembles” that underlie the Nash refinements known as perfect and proper equilibrium. This paper shows that this relationship can be used to provide a method for computing perfect and proper equilibria of n-player strategic games. This paper also shows, by example, that simulated annealing can be used to locate a perfect equilibrium in an extensive form game.

Keywords: Game; Theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-01, Revised 2010-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cmp, nep-gth and nep-ore
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Working Paper: The Computation of Perfect and Proper Equilibrium for Finite Games via Simulated Annealing (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rsm:riskun:r10_1

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