Nash equilibria of games with monotonic best replies

Filippo L. Calciano

No 108, Departmental Working Papers of Economics - University 'Roma Tre' from Department of Economics - University Roma Tre

Abstract: We introduce notions of increasingness for the best reply of a game that capture properly the intuitive idea of complementarity among players’ strategies. We show, by generalizing the fixpoint theorems of Veinott and Zhou, that the Nash sets of our games with increasing best replies are nonempty complete lattices. Hence we extend the class of games with strategic complementarities.

Keywords: Complementarity; supermodular games; fixpoint theorem; Nash equilibria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C60 C70 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 14
Date: 2009
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rtr:wpaper:0108

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