OPTIMAL FINANCIAL CONTRACTS WITH UNOBSERVABLE INVESTMENTS

Mario Tirelli (mario.tirelli@uniroma3.it)

No 230, Departmental Working Papers of Economics - University 'Roma Tre' from Department of Economics - University Roma Tre

Abstract: In this article we propose a security-design problem in which risk neutral entrepreneurs make unobservable investment decisions while employing the investment funds of risk-neutral out- side investor/creditor(s). Contracts are restricted to satisfy limited liability and monotonicity of the payment schedule. The model we present extends the classical one proposed by Innes (1990, Journal of Economic Theory 52, 47-67) along two main directions: agents' decisions may be re-stricted by their initial capital and outside financial opportunities; and their investment decisions may also consist in hiding funds in an asset placed outside their _rms. We motivate our interest in this security-design problem referring to the `opacity' that often characterizes financial decisions of small firms, a particularly large fraction of the non-financial sector in most developed countries

Keywords: Security design; asymmetric information; moral hazard; investment decisions; debt contracts, collateral. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D86 G11 G32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-12
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Related works:
Working Paper: Optimal financial contracts with unobservable investments (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rtr:wpaper:0230

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