Do Better Paid Politicians Perform Better? Disentangling Incentives from Selection
Stefano Gagliarducci () and
Tommaso Nannicini ()
No 162, CEIS Research Paper from Tor Vergata University, CEIS
The wage paid to politicians affects both the choice of citizens to run for an elective office and the performance of those who are appointed. First, if skilled individuals shy away from politics because of higher opportunities in the private sector, an increase in politicians’ pay may change their mind. Second, if the reelection prospects of incumbents depend on their in-office deeds, a higher wage may foster performance. We use data on all Italian municipal governments from 1993 to 2001 and test these hypotheses in a quasi-experimental framework. In Italy, the wage of a mayor depends on population size and sharply rises at different thresholds. We apply a regression discontinuity design to the only threshold that uniquely identifies a wage increase—5,000 inhabitants—to control for unobservable town characteristics. Exploiting the existence of a two-term limit, we further disentangle the composition from the incentive component of the effect of the wage on performance. Our results show that a higher wage attracts more educated candidates, and that better paid politicians size down the government machinery by improving internal efficiency. Importantly, most of this performance effect is driven by the selection of competent politicians, rather than by the incentive to be reelected.
Keywords: political selection; efficiency wage; term limit; regression discontinuity. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H70 J45 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 49 pages
Date: 2010-05-28, Revised 2010-05-28
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-lab and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (21) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
https://ceistorvergata.it/RePEc/rpaper/RP162.pdf Main text (application/pdf)
Journal Article: DO BETTER PAID POLITICIANS PERFORM BETTER? DISENTANGLING INCENTIVES FROM SELECTION (2013)
Working Paper: Do Better Paid Politicians Perform Better? Disentangling Incentives from Selection (2009)
Working Paper: Do Better Paid Politicians Perform Better? Disentangling Incentives from Selection (2008)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:162
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
CEIS - Centre for Economic and International Studies - Faculty of Economics - University of Rome "Tor Vergata" - Via Columbia, 2 00133 Roma
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in CEIS Research Paper from Tor Vergata University, CEIS CEIS - Centre for Economic and International Studies - Faculty of Economics - University of Rome "Tor Vergata" - Via Columbia, 2 00133 Roma. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Barbara Piazzi ().