Auctions versus Negotiations: Evidence from Public Procurement in the Italian Healthcare Sector

Mercedes Vellez ()
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Mercedes Vellez: Faculty of Economics, University of Rome "Tor Vergata", http://www.ceistorvergata.it

No 191, CEIS Research Paper from Tor Vergata University, CEIS

Abstract: This paper contributes to the empirical literature on auctions and negotiations. Using healthcare facilities data on procurement contracts, I find evidence that auctions do not yield lower prices than negotiations. This result is robust to specifications tackling quality differences, endogenous participation, and the bilateral and multilateral nature of negotiated procedures. I also find evidence that late payments reduce competition and thus affect firms’ participation choices. A simple test based on Benford’s Law is used to rule out collusion among participants as a possible explanation of the results.

Keywords: Auctions; negotiations; procurement; medical technology; competition; endogeneity; collusion. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C36 H57 I18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 37 pages
Date: 2011-03-29, Revised 2011-03-29
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-hea
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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