Non-Exclusive Competition under Adverse Selection

Andrea Attar, Thomas Mariotti and François Salanié
Additional contact information
Thomas Mariotti: Toulouse School of Economics
François Salanié: Toulouse School of Economics

No 192, CEIS Research Paper from Tor Vergata University, CEIS

Abstract: Consider a seller of a divisible good, facing several identical buyers. The quality of the good may be low or high, and is the seller's private information. The seller has strictly convex preferences that satisfy a single-crossing property. Buyers compete by posting arbitrary menus of contracts. Competition is non-exclusive in that the seller can simultaneously and secretly trade with several buyers. We fully characterize conditions for the existence of an equilibrium. Equilibrium aggregate allocations are unique. Any traded contract must yield zero profit. If a quality is indeed traded, then it is traded efficiently. Depending on parameters, both qualities may be traded, or only one of them, or the market may break down completely to a no-trade equilibrium.

Keywords: Adverse Selection; Competing Mechanisms; Non-Exclusivity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 D82 D86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 45 pages
Date: 2011-03-31, Revised 2011-03-31
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-cta
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://ceistorvergata.it/RePEc/rpaper/RP192.pdf Main text (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Nonexclusive competition under adverse selection (2014)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:192

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
CEIS - Centre for Economic and International Studies - Faculty of Economics - University of Rome "Tor Vergata" - Via Columbia, 2 00133 Roma
https://ceistorvergata.it

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEIS Research Paper from Tor Vergata University, CEIS CEIS - Centre for Economic and International Studies - Faculty of Economics - University of Rome "Tor Vergata" - Via Columbia, 2 00133 Roma. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Barbara Piazzi ().