The Vote With the Wallet as a Multiplayer Prisoner’s Dilemma
Leonardo Becchetti () and
Francesco Salustri ()
No 359, CEIS Research Paper from Tor Vergata University, CEIS
Socially responsible consumers and investors are increasingly using their consumption and saving choices as a “vote with the wallet” to award companies which are at vanguard in reconciling the creation of economic value with social and environmental sustainability. In our paper we model the vote with the wallet as a multiplayer prisoner’s dilemma, outline equilibria and possible solutions to the related coordination failure problem, apply our analysis to domains in which the vote with the wallet is empirically more relevant, and provide policy suggestions
Keywords: Corporate Social Responsibility; Multiplayer Prisoner’s Dilemma; Voting with the Wallet (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 D11 H41 M14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-soc
Date: 2015-11-08, Revised 2015-11-08
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Working Paper: The Vote With the Wallet as a Multiplayer Prisoner's Dilemma (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:359
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