The Effect of Discretion on Procurement Performance

Decio Coviello (), Andrea Guglielmo () and Giancarlo Spagnolo
Additional contact information
Decio Coviello: HEC Montréal
Andrea Guglielmo: University of Wisconsin - Madison

No 361, CEIS Research Paper from Tor Vergata University, CEIS

Abstract: We run a regression discontinuity design analysis to document the causal effect of increasing buyers' discretion on procurement outcomes in a large database for public works in Italy. Works with a value above a given threshold have to be awarded through an open auction. Works below this threshold can be more easily awarded through a restricted auction, where the buyer has some discretion in terms of who (not) to invite to bid. Our main result is that discretion increases the probability that the same firm wins repeatedly, and it does not deteriorate (and may improve) the procurement outcomes we observe. The effects of discretion persist when we repeat the analysis controlling for the geographical location, corruption, social capital and judicial efficiency in the region of the public buyers running the auctions.

Keywords: Procurement; Restricted Auctions; Regression Discontinuity; Regulatory Discretion. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C31 D02 D44 L11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 85 pages
Date: 2015-11-17, Revised 2015-11-17
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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https://ceistorvergata.it/RePEc/rpaper/RP361.pdf Main text (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: The effect of discretion on procurement performance (2016)
Working Paper: The Effect of Discretion on Procurement Performance (2016)
Working Paper: The effect of discretion on procurement performance (2016)
Working Paper: The Effect of Discretion on Procurement Performance (2015)
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