Maintaining Competition in Recurrent Procurement Contracts: A case study on the London Bus Market
Elisabetta Iossa and
No 400, CEIS Research Paper from Tor Vergata University, CEIS
Under recurrent procurement, the awarding of a contract to a firm may put it in an advantageous position in future tenders, which may reduce competition over time. The objective of this paper is to study the dynamics of competition for tendered contracts, focusing on factors that may generate incumbent advantage. Particular attention is given to learning economies, sunk costs of entry and switching costs for the procurer. The paper then applies these insights to analyse empirically the evolution of competition in the market for local bus services in London.
Keywords: Dynamic Competition; Procurement and Incumbent advantage (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L24 L92 L40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cta and nep-reg
Date: 2017-02-24, Revised 2017-02-24
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
ftp://www.ceistorvergata.it/repec/rpaper/RP400.pdf Main text (application/pdf)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:400
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
CEIS - Centre for Economic and International Studies - Faculty of Economics - University of Rome "Tor Vergata" - Via Columbia, 2 00133 Roma
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in CEIS Research Paper from Tor Vergata University, CEIS CEIS - Centre for Economic and International Studies - Faculty of Economics - University of Rome "Tor Vergata" - Via Columbia, 2 00133 Roma. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Barbara Piazzi ().