Financial literacy and bank runs: an experimental analysis
Eloisa Campioni,
Vittorio Larocca (),
Loredana Mirra and
Luca Panaccione
Additional contact information
Vittorio Larocca: Luiss Guido Carli
No 402, CEIS Research Paper from Tor Vergata University, CEIS
Abstract:
We set up an experimental coordination game among bank depositors à la Diamond and Dybvig (1983). We elicit subjects’ financial literacy and study the impact of revealing this information on the coordination problem typical of this game with multiple equilibria. We find that when no information is revealed the likelihood of runs increases with bank size, while when information on financial literacy is disclosed it increases in small banks and decreases in large ones. Over all banks’ dimensions, the probability of coordinating on the inefficient equilibrium is lower when the average financial literacy revealed to the group is higher.
Keywords: Bank Run; Laboratory Experiment; Financial Literacy; Coordination Game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 D80 G21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
Date: 2017-04-20, Revised 2017-07-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cdm, nep-exp and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)
Downloads: (external link)
https://ceistorvergata.it/RePEc/rpaper/RP402.pdf Main text (application/pdf)
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:402
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
CEIS - Centre for Economic and International Studies - Faculty of Economics - University of Rome "Tor Vergata" - Via Columbia, 2 00133 Roma
https://ceistorvergata.it
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in CEIS Research Paper from Tor Vergata University, CEIS CEIS - Centre for Economic and International Studies - Faculty of Economics - University of Rome "Tor Vergata" - Via Columbia, 2 00133 Roma. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Barbara Piazzi ().