К теории рынков. Статья 2. Социодинамическое описание рынков опекаемых благ

On the Theory of 'Patronized Goods' Markets. 2nd article. Sociodynamic Description of Patronized Goods Markets

Alexander Rubinstein

Working papers from Institute of Economics

Abstract: В данной статье продолжен анализ рынка опекаемых благ. Автор предлагает свою трактовку проблемы с позиций концепции социодинамики. Дается краткая характеристика этой концепции; повторяется цепочка последовательных шагов построения обобщенной модели Викселля-Линдаля применительно к рынку опекаемых благ. Автор делает вывод, что государство не должно имитировать поведение мецената, а будучи важнейшим институтом общества, выступать за коллективные интересы, реализация которых предполагает опеку некоторых товаров и услуг

The article represents a continuation of patronized goods market analysis. The author proposes his interpretation of the problem in the light of sociodynamics conception, whose brief description is given. The chain of successive steps in building a generalized Wicksell-Lindahl model applied to patronized goods market is reproduced. The author draws the conclusion that the state should not imitate patron's behavior, but, being a most important institute of society, should be 'responsible' for collective interests, whose realization presupposes the protection of selected goods and services

Keywords: Patronized goods; normative interests; market failures; public goods; merit goods; Baumol economy; patronized goods markets; Economic Sociodynamics; competitive equilibrium; Pareto optimum; equilibrium model for patronized goods; subsidies; transfers; public priorities; social policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B41 D50 D6 H40 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 13 pages
Date: 2008-10-10
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Published in Obshchestvennye nauki i sovremennost, 2009, no. 2, pp. 138-150.

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rua:wpaper:y:2009:a:pru175:n:2

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