Trust, Primary Commodity Dependence and Segregation

A. Schollaert () and Dirk Van de gaer

Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Belgium from Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration

Abstract: Many third world countries seem to fail to create a growth-promoting and peaceful institutional framework and are plagued by ethnic, religious or social conflict. This paper focuses on the impact of primary commodities on group behavior and, thus, on the nature of the resulting societies. Strategies are analyzed in a basic one-shot game with two players and two strategies, in which priors vis-a-vis the other player matter. We show that poverty, foreign interference and trust influence a group's willingness to cooperate. Under some circumstances (partial) segregation and (political) strife prove to be utility-maximizing and equilibrium strategies.

Keywords: Non Cooperative Games; Natural Resources; Trust. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D74 O13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2003-08
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rug:rugwps:03/190

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