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Boycotts, power politics or trust building: how to prevent conflict?

A. Schollaert () and Dirk Van de gaer

Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Belgium from Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration

Abstract: In a game of imperfect information, the paper analyzes whether different types of intervention by third parties can ensure that political (ethnic, religious, social, . . . ) groups within a country will pursue a cooperative strategy and how easy it is to predict their effects. We conclude that a strong boycott is the most effective instrument, then comes a weak boycott, followed by power politics. Finally, apart from requiring very detailed information on the relevant parameters of the economy, the use of confidence building measures has a serious flaw: it is incapable of averting civil war.

Keywords: Non Cooperative Games; Third-party Intervention; Conflict Prevention (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39 pages
Date: 2005-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-pol, nep-reg and nep-soc
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Related works:
Working Paper: Boycotts, power politics, or trust building: How to prevent conflict? (2009) Downloads
Journal Article: Boycotts, Power Politics, or Trust Building: How to Prevent Conflict? (2008) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rug:rugwps:05/308

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