The Agency Model as a Predictor of the Size of the Internal Audit Function in Belgian Companies

G. Sarens ()
Additional contact information
G. Sarens: -

Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Belgium from Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration

Abstract: This study contributes to the literature by using an agency model to explain the size of internal audit functions in a non-Anglo-Saxon environment. Data to test this model were collected from annual reports and a questionnaire sent to Chief Audit Executives. The results show that the agency model has high explanatory power and reveals that the more diffused the ownership structure of the company, the larger the company and the more reporting levels within the company, the larger the internal audit function. The results of this study confirm the growing monitoring role of internal auditing in contemporary corporate governance.

Keywords: internal auditing; Belgium; agency theory; questionnaire; annual report (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 2007-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc and nep-bec
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://wps-feb.ugent.be/Papers/wp_07_458.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rug:rugwps:07/458

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Belgium from Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Nathalie Verhaeghe ().