The Role of the Median Legislator in U.S. Trade Policy: A Historical Analysis

Wendy L. Hansen () and Thomas Prusa
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Wendy L. Hansen: University of New Mexico

Departmental Working Papers from Rutgers University, Department of Economics

Abstract: In this historical analysis of U.S. trade policy, we apply the median voter model to explain legislative decision-making. In this model, the level of tariff protection is expected to change with changes in the median legislator. We show that this simple model does a remarkable job of explaining trade policy until the mid-1930s, when it breaks down. We offer several possible explanations for the breakdown of this model, focusing particularly on the impact of domestic and international institutional changes that may have altered the role of the median legislator in trade policy formation.

Keywords: median voter; tariffs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997-03-09
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Journal Article: The Role of the Median Legislator in U.S. Trade Policy: A Historical Analysis (1997)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rut:rutres:199622

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