Social Learning and Coordination Conventions in Intergenerational Games: An Experiment in Lamarckian Evolutionary Dynamics

Barry Sopher and Andrew Schotter

Departmental Working Papers from Rutgers University, Department of Economics

Keywords: coordination conventions; experimental games; intergenerational games; social learning (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-10-24
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rut:rutres:200021

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