THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF KOSHER WARS

Ira Gang and Gil Epstein

Departmental Working Papers from Rutgers University, Department of Economics

Abstract: In this paper we develop a theory of Kosher Wars under which Rabbis (certifying authorities) compete to enhance the level of Jewish observation of their congregations. The level of observance can be seen as the Rabbi's rents. Our rent-seeking model explains the establishment of Kashrut standards, first with European style community control under a single Rabbi, and then under America's voluntary structure with the possibility of competing Rabbis.

Keywords: dietary restrictions; Kashrut; kosher; religion; rent-seeking (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 Z12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-11-25
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rut:rutres:200227

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