Who Is the Enemy?
Ira Gang () and
Gil Epstein ()
Departmental Working Papers from Rutgers University, Department of Economics
We examine who benefits when there is a strong leader in place, and those who benefit when a situation lacks a proper leader. There are fractious terrorist groups who seek to serve the same people in common cause against a common enemy. The groups compete for rents obtained from the public by engaging in actions against the common enemy. We derive a condition under which the concerned parties, the terrorist groups and the local population upon whom the terrorist groups inflict their actions, benefit or lose in the two scenarios, and examine the consequences of counter-terrorist policy.
Keywords: terrorism; rent-seeking; all-pay auction; lottery (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: WHO IS THE ENEMY? (2007)
Working Paper: Who is the Enemy? (2004)
Working Paper: Who Is the Enemy? (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rut:rutres:200427
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