Conflict Games with Payoff Uncertainty

Sandeep Baliga () and Tomas Sjostrom

Departmental Working Papers from Rutgers University, Department of Economics

Abstract: Stag hunt and chicken games are canonical representations of two kinds of strategic interactions. In stag hunt, aggression feeds on itself, and mutual fear escalates into conflict. Chicken is a model of preemption and deterrence. With complete information, these games have multiple Nash equilbria. Using standard arguments from the Industrial Organization literature, we find sufficient conditions under which payoff uncertainty generates a unique equilibrium. These conditions encompass information structures ranging from independent types (as in our previous work) to highly correlated types (as in global games).

Keywords: conflict; global games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2009-08-28
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sas.rutgers.edu/virtual/snde/wp/2009-05.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rut:rutres:200905

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Departmental Working Papers from Rutgers University, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().