Monitoring and Enforcement of Climate Policy

Hilary Sigman

Departmental Working Papers from Rutgers University, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper applies recent research on environmental enforcement to a potential U.S. program to control greenhouse gases, especially through emission trading. Climate policies present the novel problem of integrating emissions reductions that are relatively easy to monitor (such as carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuels) with those that may be very difficult to monitor (such as some emissions of other greenhouse gases). The paper documents the heterogeneity in monitoring costs across different parts of current carbon markets. It argues that a broad emission trading system that includes more difficult-to-enforce components can provide less incentive to violate the law than a narrower program; thus, the government may not find it more costly to assure compliance with a broader program.

Keywords: Environmental Economics; Climate Change; Public Enforcement of Law (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K42 Q54 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2010-08-04
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Forthcoming in "The Design and Implementation of U.S. Climate Policy," D. Fullerton and C. Wolfram, eds. University of Chicago Press.

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sas.rutgers.edu/virtual/snde/wp/2010-06.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Chapter: Monitoring and Enforcement of Climate Policy (2011)
Working Paper: Monitoring and Enforcement of Climate Policy (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rut:rutres:201006

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Departmental Working Papers from Rutgers University, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().