On Essential Nash Equilibria in Normal-Form Games

Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau

Departmental Working Papers from Rutgers University, Department of Economics

Abstract: A Nash equilibrium x of a normal-form game G is essential if any perturbation of G has an equilibrium close to x. Using payoff perturbations, we identify a new collection of games containing a dense, residual subset of games whose Nash equilibria are all essential. This collection subsumes the sets of games considered in the literature. An economic game illustrates our results.

Keywords: infinite normal-form game; equilibrium refinement; essential equilibrium; equilibrium existence; B-security (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2012-12-30
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rut:rutres:201209

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