Underinvestment and Capital Misallocation Under Sovereign Risk

Carlos Esquivel

Departmental Working Papers from Rutgers University, Department of Economics

Abstract: Capital and its sectoral allocation affect default incentives. Under general assumptions, default risk is decreasing in the total stock of capital and increasing in the share of capital allocated to non-tradable production. This implies that when competitive households make all investment decisions capital has two externalities: a capital-stock externality and a portfolio externality. These hamper the ability of a benevolent government to make optimal borrowing and default decisions and are exacerbated during periods of distress. Competitive equilibria feature underinvestment, larger non-traded sectors, more default, and lower debt and consumption than a centralized planner's allocation. Select number of author(s): : 1

Keywords: Soveriegn default; Underinvestment; Investment externalities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F34 F41 H63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
Date: 2024-11-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge, nep-fdg, nep-inv and nep-opm
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http://www.sas.rutgers.edu/virtual/snde/wp/2024-02.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Underinvestment and capital misallocation under sovereign risk (2024)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rut:rutres:202402

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