Does Limited Punishment Limit the Scope for Cross-Retaliation?

Richard Chisik and Harun Onder

No 25, Working Papers from Toronto Metropolitan University, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper analyzes two prominent institutional rules in the international trading system: a limited cross-retaliation rule characterized by the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) Article 22.3 and a limited punishment rule characterized by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Article XXVIII. In general, both rules are designed to limit the countermeasures upon a violation; however, the former rule specifies the limits of composition in retaliation, whereas the latter one designates the limits of retaliation magnitude. We show that, albeit seemingly unrelated, the limited cross-retaliation rule complements the limited punishment rule in per- mitting greater trade liberalization. Specifically, we show how the limited cross-retaliation rule also helps limit the incentives to violate the trade agreement when the limited punishment rule prevails.

Pages: 36 pages
Date: 2010-08, Revised 2016-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-int
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Journal Article: DOES LIMITED PUNISHMENT LIMIT THE SCOPE FOR CROSS RETALIATION? (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rye:wpaper:wp025

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