Social Preferences in Wage Bargaining: a Neocorporatist Approach

Giuseppina Autiero and Bruna Bruno

No 72, CELPE Discussion Papers from CELPE - CEnter for Labor and Political Economics, University of Salerno, Italy

Abstract: The starting point in this paper is based on the strand of the literature on corporatist systems stressing the role of co-operation and consensus in wage bargaining in order to reach better economic performances. In order to model a co-operative regime in the classical framework in which the monopoly union controls wages and the firm controls employment, we introduce social preferences with some degree of other-regarding concern(ORC) such that each agent's objective function is a linear combination of her own welfare and the other's. The results show that under specific conditions concerning the degree of ORC, one may obtain an employment level higher than in the selfish case and wage moderation.

Keywords: wage bargaining; corporatism; cooperation; social preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J50 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 2003
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hrm and nep-lab
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