Maximal Fines and Corruption: an Experimental Study on Illegal Waste Disposal

Antonio Abatemarco, Alessandro Cascavilla (), Roberto Dell'Anno and Andrea Morone
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Alessandro Cascavilla: UnitelmaSapienza Università degli Studi di Roma, https://www.unitelmasapienza.it/alessandro-cascavilla/

No 166, CELPE Discussion Papers from CELPE - CEnter for Labor and Political Economics, University of Salerno, Italy

Abstract: Corruption is known to be one of the real life situations which may jeopardize the effectiveness of fines in deterring crime. We present a model of ‘crime with corruption’ by which both the dilution of crime deterrence due to corruption, as well as the possibility of crime encouraging fines are formally highlighted. More importantly, by running an experiment on a subject pool of students for the case of illegal waste disposal, we provide experimental evidence on the validity of our theoretical predictions. We find that increasing fine rate may become crime encouraging or at least ineffective, beyond a context-specific fine threshold. In a policy perspective, we suggest that the optimal design of a crime-deterring sanctioning system must simultaneously account for both corruption practices and anti-corruption policies.

Keywords: corruption; crime; fine; waste (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 H10 K14 K42 Q50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 51 pages
Date: 2023-12-24
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-law
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Working Paper: Maximal Fines and Corruption: An Experimental Study on Illegal Waste Disposal (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sal:celpdp:0166

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